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ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM ADAPTED TO
CITIZEN SUIT PROCESSES
BRION BLACKWELDER*
INTRODUCrION
Many of us working in environmental citizen suits will spend very large
portions of our careers mired down in aspects of the legal process that really
should not exist. Some chronic impediments jeopardize and compromise the
very effectiveness of environmental law. We all know about the devastation
wreaked upon public involvement by strategic suits deterring public participation,
especially in siting decisions and land use issues. We watch with deep despair
over wholesale displacement of environmental concerns, such as in expropriation
compensation provisions in international trade. We face situations such as
sustainability only to find a lack of objective standards leaves everything to a
political process. We rely upon government experts, only to have to navigate the
maze of the Housekeeping Statute to get the chance to obtain their testimony.
And especially under state law, the fees for attorneys and experts under
provisions for citizen suits may be so tenuous or adverse as to deter enforcement
actions by citizens.
Certain core problems for citizen suits ought to be addressed by
environmental legal professionalism. This somnolent field can be awakened and
transformed. The field has yielded no specific construction for environmental
professionalism. It is time to put forward some solutions.
Previous calls for change in professional ethics from leading scholars in
environmental law stop short of describing specific methods. Culture, however,
has not stopped short in its demand that environmental ethics be brought about
by environmental law. To meet these calls for change and to link general
environmental ethics to the profession, is a matter for a construction of
professionalism. To create such a construction, it is ordinarily productive to use
a widely acceptable theory for a source.
Here, the source drawn upon is the renowned ethical theory of democracy,
known as "deliberative democracy." This political theory is quite dynamic and
applicable, affording a foundation of professionalism for environmental law,
distinct from traditional professionalism. At its heart, deliberative democracy
creates processes for genuine inclusiveness and preparation of participants. This
paper imports the political ethics theory directly into a legal professionalism
definition, called here to set it apart, "green legal professionalism." The
definition addresses processes arising in the legal system that broadly determine
the prospect of citizen suits, to place those processes at the forefront of
environmental professionalism. The definition establishes an agenda for an
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activist professionalism. While theoretical underpinnings are often of lesser
interest to the practical professionals engaged in citizen suits, the rest of the
profession who determine the parameters of professionalism will be skeptical of
recognizing different treatment for environmental law until its basis is presented.
And despite the often indirect nature of professionalism, unless it becomes part
of the approach, problems will remain. If we ignore the potential of a revised
professionalism to change unethical processes now thwarting citizens'
environmental litigation, many suits will never happen, many cannot succeed, and
many will make us wish we never tried.
So while having a "construction" or model for green legal professionalism is
beneficial, the citizen suit practitioner wants practical guidance, "give me
something I can use." The following highlights leading dilemmas where
environmental law could be augmented by professionalism, to help its delivery
of society's prescribed future. These examples are intended to persuade citizen
suit practitioners that they can keep or gain much ground through
professionalism. The most basic theoretical terms and definitions are set out
first, then core citizen suit applications are presented. Some necessary discussion
of the background and implications then follows.
I. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
Bob Pepperman Taylor, who works in the environmental branch of ethics, has
given a definition of environmental ethics. He states it is the "essential task of
environmental ethics: to investigate [1] the nature of our moral obligations to the
natural world and [2] the principles for resolving conflicts between our
environmental and our human values."'
The components of Taylor's definition can help give the components of
environmental legal ethics. First, it frames environmental ethics' task as
investigation for what the moral obligation is. From Christopher D. Stone's
observations, it is clear the law inquiry needs to know what the "standards for
which morality has spoken" are.2 Once we find the future that society has
chosen, then we can go forward with the law inquiry. Stone opts out, however,
of getting law into the business of "generating and justifying general standards
of conduct."3 This is reasonable, for it would be unproductive to expect lawyers
to be the ones to decide what society should want for its environment, as it is a
cultural question for the whole of society. Lawyers do need society to provide
them parameters of an environmental ethic. The second matter framed by
1. Bob Pepperman Taylor, Democray and Environmental Ethics, in DEMOCRACY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 86,104 (William M. Lafferty &James Meadowcrofteds., 1996) (numerical division
supplied) (citation omitted).
2. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICSq: THE CASE POR MORAL
PLURALISM 41 (1987).
3. Id
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Taylor's definition addresses the investigation of conflict resolution principles.4
Stone also states this is the main law task, the "emphasis is on authoritatively
implementing" the morally selected standards, "how we arrange our affairs" to
get us to that future.5
So here it is. Are we lawyers really implementing society's intended
environmental future? Or, are we pushing around with no professionalism to call
us to account, to make us select for the processes necessary to lead to that future?
Some valuable suggestions for how to find out if we have so arranged our
affairs come from political scientist John S. Dryzek, who has both evaluated
democratic theory and examined environmentalism.' In democratic theory prior
to about 1990, more satisfaction existed for making collective democratic
decisions under the methods of voting, representation, and interest aggregation
like political parties or interest groups. Although democratic legitimacy under
such methods became questioned, the questioning is an essential part of
democracy's constant discussion of its own processes.
7
There came, in this postmodern era, "a strong deliberative turn" in the theory
of democracy. "Increasingly, democratic legitimacy came to be seen in terms of
the ability or opportunity to participate in effective deliberation on the part of
those subject to collective decisions. ' The deliberation means reflective
communication, a social process in which the participants are amenable to
altering their views. Removed from the deliberation are coercive aspects of
domination, manipulation, threats, and similar "agents of distortion," as the
participants are to have equality in deliberative competence. Authenticity in the
democracy comes from the degree the "reflective preferences influence collective
outcomes."'
To arrange our affairs to get us to values endorsed by our communities,
Dryzek presents ecological democratization as the condition for which we should
investigate. His effort finds a mechanism compatible with our political principles
to implement the community values. Dryzek concludes "ecological democracy"
leads to the success of community interests over selfish interests."' The key is
4. Taylor, supra note 1, at 104.
5. STONE, supra note 2, at 41.
6. Among his writings on the subject are: JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS, AND CONTFSTAIONS (2000) [hereinafter DEI.IBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY]; JOHN S. DRYZEK, TiiE POLITICSq OF T1i- EARTHi: ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSES
(1997) [hereinafter POLITICS OF TIE EARTH]; and John S. Dryzek, Strateies of Ecological
Democraization, in DEMOCRACY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 108 (William M. Laffcrty & James
Meadowcroft eds., 1996) [hereinafter Dryzek].
7. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 1.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2. Dryzek points out that deliberative democracy as a process dates back to ancient
Greece, with many contributors through history, and supporters who identify themselves as
deliberative democrats, such as John Rawls. Id
10. POLITICS OF THE EARTH, supra note 6, at 200.
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bona fide democratic debate. He sets out details of his approach, to describe
how categories of actions enhance democratic values. Dryzek indicates:
enhancement of democratic values, or democratization, may be unpacked into three
aspects: franchise refers simply to the number of individuals participating in any
setting, scope concerns the range of issues which are subject to popular control,
and authenticity refers to the degree to which this control is substantive as opposed
to symbolic, informed as opposed to ignorant, and engaged in competent fashion.
Positive movement in any one of these criteria constitutes democratization."
II. A DEFINITION FOR GREEN LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM
So the ethical principles help us assemble an entire statement of definition for
green professionalism inquiries. The proposed definition is as follows:
Green lgalprofessionalism recognizes the law is to help socety achieve an environmentalfuture as
expressed in leadingformulations by socety of its moral obligations towards the environment. The
methodologyfor law is analogous to other ecological democratitation. The numbers of individuals
partipating in any setting must be sufficient to achieve the selected future. The range of issues
subject to participation must be capable of achieving the elected future. The participation must
be substantive as opposed to ymboic. The participation must be informed as opposed to ignorant.
The participation must be engaged in competent fashion. Lauyers'professional conduct should
work for achievement of the environmentalfuture and ecological democratization.' 2
Thus, green professionalism emphasizes the practice of law that supports
participation and participants in sufficient numbers to achieve the environmental
future society intends. It is the way ordinary or popular environmental ethics,
such as a community value standard, bear upon lawyers' professional conduct in
an adversary system. Its mechanism of ecological democratization works upon
the accepted processes Dryzek describes of our culture's social and political
system. 3 The value standards are ones inclusive of society's other values, such
as economic considerations and environmental justice.
Does an attorney need to espouse an environmental ethic, in order to promote
this construction of professionalism? The answer is no, because the purpose of
ecological democratization is to allow persons who do advocate from any motive
to be able to legitimately present their rationale as environmental decisions are
made. The professionalism opens the process to the ethical alternatives so
important in our society. Whatever ethic an attorney and the clients may
espouse, professionalism should expect that members privileged to be in the
11. Dryzek, supra note 6, at 109 (emphasis deleted).
12. This proposed definition is the author's, derived from the ideas of Dryzek, Taylor, and
Stone in the foregoing discussion.
13. The franchise, scope and authenticity processes in Dryzek's definition of democratization,
Dryzek, supra note 6, at 108, 109, are also explained by him in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRAcy, supra
note 6, at 29.
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profession will work for democratic principles when the legal system works out
the disputes, so that society's ethic will be fairly considered. The adversary
system, which benefits from professionalism, necessarily accepts fairness. In
Futrell's terms, the practitioner counseling reluctant clients who do not share in
the vision of Earth Day will get some support. Futrell's hypothetical lawyer will
need to tell the client that because of the current state of environmental law, the
effect of what the client wants will be evaluated in terms of ecological
democratization because that is what environmental law has come to be
understood to mean in the profession." And, the democratization is more than
a process occurring within the profession. It is a cooperative venture among
social institutions, one being the institution of lawyering. Deliberative and
discoursive theorists see the methodology as of increasing significance in the
approaches to be taken for problems worldwide. 5
III. CORE CONTROVERSIES FOR GREEN LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM: SLAPP,
TRADE AGREEMENTS, SUSTAINABILITY AND OBJECTIVE S'FANDAIS,
AVAILABILITY OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, AND AiT-ORNEYS Fis
Green legal professionalism needs to take on the Strategic Lawsuit Against
Public Participation (SLAPP) suit. This is an aspect of Dryzek's franchise, where
the inclusiveness and treatment of participants in the legal setting is at stake. 6
In SLAPP suits, quick disposition by injunction upon improper conduct should
suffice as a remedy. They should never jeopardize the free speech and
willingness of participants in environmental matters.
Green legal professionalism needs to intercede against certain international
trade proposals that threaten to globalize an expansively re-defined takings
doctrine, and thereby oblige compensation of investment affected by
environmental regulations. This is an aspect of ecological democratization's
scope, where the range of issues the participants are allowed to address is
jeopardized. The upshot is that if international trade wishes to prevent
protectionism masquerading as environmental regulation, it must give intense
attention as to whether the regulation is bona fide and carefully constructed to
address a legitimate environmental need, rather than preemptively destroying the
regulation by making it only effective upon compensation. That is, trade needs
to find ways to reject pretextual regulations, and ways to respect authentically-
based regulations. Trade solutions that undercut environmental regulations run
against the environmental ethic, which is too strong in our culture and in our
laws to be treated in that fashion without enormously acrimonious reaction.
Green legal professionalism tells international trade to find real processes to
14. J. William Futrell, Envirnmental Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Codes of Professional Reiponsibiity,
27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 825, 825 (1994).
15. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 115-39, 174-75.
16. Id at 29.
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protect investors from the only thing from which they deserve protection
(currently usually meaning compensation), that is, nationalizing or expropriating
(essentially meaning stealing) an investment for selfish motive. This is in contrast
to the inherent limitation property has of public uses and purposes as well as
private ones.' Expanding the takings doctrine of the U.S. beyond real property
is a shocking contradiction to the environmental trend in property law,
recognizing the "green wood" and context aspects that accompany property
ownership as limitations.'"
Key professionalism issues of authenticity are set out according to its three
aspects in the foregoing definition proposed for green legal professionalism:
substantive as opposed to symbolic, informed as opposed to ignorant, and
engaged in competent fashion.
The professionalism has to press for scientific methodologies to replace
political ones, to provide a reviewable standard, as has finally occurred to a
notable extent in fisheries management. Dryzekian analysis would identify such
progress as part of authenticity, where the participants' input is genuinely, rather
than symbolically, included in the minds of decision-makers."'
The aspect of how much information and expertise is available to the
participants is discussed in terms of the availability of governmental experts for
citizen suits. In Dryzek's terms this is also authenticity, where participants have
available the information and expertise necessary in the setting.2" Experts from
government must be available to litigants, state or federal, free of politicization.
And, the practical availability of attorneys fees to citizen suits is a central
concern. In ecological democratization terms this is also a part of authenticity,
often determining whether the quality, skill and resources of the participants rises
to the level necessary in the context. The participants need to be boosted, by
improved citizen suit attorney fees provisions in state and federal laws.
And in exchange, green legal professionalism works to eliminate delay and
unfairness. Knowing the process is inclusive, and that objective standards are
involved, supporters of environmental law do not need to rely on desperate
attempts to frustrate approvals while they hope for political change. Elimination
of gamesmanship can reduce society's perception of environmental laws and their
supporters as obstructions and obstructionists, and will certainly boost economic
benefits and investors.
The agenda of green legal professionalism is inclusion of environmental
consideration, and participation, in legal disputes. The agenda is defense and
advocacy of a process of ecological democratization in the law.
17. The idea to regard property as private in its possession but common or communal in its
use dates to Aristotle's Pohkics II, 1263a30.
18. See RobertJ. Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics and
Ecology into Real Propery Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 347 (1998).
19. POLITICS OF THE EARTH, supra note 6, at 109.
20. Id
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A. The Inclusiveness and Treatment of Participants in the Legal Setting: SLAPP Suits
A phenomenon limiting ecological democratization generally, and particularly
citizen suits, is one that originated in environmental citizen suits and disputes: the
Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation, known to environmental lawyers
as SLAPP, is a term coined in a 1988 article by Professors George Pring and
Penelope Canan. 2' They define SLAPP as four elements: 1) a civil complaint or
counterclaim for monetary damages, 2) filed against nongovernmental individuals
or organizations, 3) because of their communication to government bodies,
government officials or the electorate, and 4) on a substantial issue of some
public interest or concern.2' Many forms of SLAPP occur, from independent
actions to counterclaims. Often it is the threat or risk of SLAPP and its close
cousin, sanctions, that is the deterrent.
There are only generalized projections of the number of environmental
enforcements by citizens that have been deterred by the prospect of SLAPP.2'
But if a citizen suit practitioner of local issues like zoning or siting of undesirable
land uses is asked, the probability is they will relate many examples of deterred
citizens, abundant conversations about local organizations investing scarce
resources into officer and director liability insurance, and citizens organizations
who have become so cautious as to destroy their function as activists and voices
in society.
In short, SLAPP has replaced standing as the primary focus needed for the
green legal professionalism inquiry of the franchise, especially in land use, zoning,
and siting. Allowing such suits against persons actively engaged in free speech
and legal redress of grievances is of serious consequence to community activists
upon whose participation many environmental implementations are meant to
rely.
Citizen suit clients are, by way of analogy, akin to private attorneys general. '
Some comparison may be made between their treatment and that of a federal
prosecutor. The federal prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from civil actions
based upon prosecutorial acts, "even when committed with ill-will", and "even
if the prosecutor presents false evidence or withholds exculpatory evidence." 2
21. Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Pubfic Partipation, 35 SoC.
PROBS. 506 (1988).
22. Penelope Canan & George W. Pring,Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Pub'c Partipation:
Mixinguantitative andQuahtative Approaches, 22 L. & So('y REV. 385, 387 (1988).
23. Some of these are summarized in a publication available from the ()FFICE oF ATroRNEY
GENERAL OF FLORIDA, STrRATEGIC LAwsurTs AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (SIAPPs) IN
FLORIDA: SURVEY AND REPORT (1993).
24. For a definition of Private Attorneys General, found under the Attorneys General
definition, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 129 (6th ed. 1990).
25. Rodolphe J.A. de Seife, The King is Dead, Long Live the King! The Court-Created American
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While the doctrine of this sovereign immunity has had its basis questioned, it
serves to protect against meritless suits and protects officials pursuing their
duties.26 Reform suggestions are that it is "possible to create a system in which
lawyers and litigants are properly discouraged from bringing frivolous lawsuits,
where claims are handled in an efficient and fair manner, andprosecutors, among
others, are held accountable for their tortious conduct." 7 Such reforms might
take the form of an administrative court system, one that is "expert, efficient,
impartial" and not burdening the court system or allowing remedies of a
disproportionate nature, balancing the need for accountability and justice against
the burdens on the courts and agencies.2'
Of course, citizen suit clients are not prosecutors, but they are inadequately
shielded from meritdess tort claims. The whole scenario interferes with their
performance of their civic duties to their communities. SLAPP has turned civic
and community activists into sheep, widely and pervasively destroying the
involvement of the public in public decisions.
The net product on the citizen activist side is that only the toughest-minded
citizens tend to bring the citizen suits or to be active and outspoken, and it is
hard for groups unfamiliar with litigation to remain involved. The net result on
the developer side is that bullying and mind-game tactics have become a regular
feature. Forget about accomplishing the ethical goal of society's environmental
law in this setting. Yet a central theme of the environmental ethic is "community
value." But how can a community generate its value where it is so intimidated?
Our professionalism question arises: Do we have a process that fosters the
end result intended by our society for its environmental quality? Of course, we
do not. The process is diverted into another dimension of dispute detached from
the desired environmental outcome. Citizens are reluctant to participate, and
developers go forward with whatever they can influence the agencies to approve.
Cases become very rare. The cases now involve hard-minded citizens pushed to
the limit, who wage all-out litigation warfare with a developmental interest
(usually with some anything-goes agency dragged along) which gambled on its
bullying strategy instead of re-evaluating its proposal, which stretched and
contorted the limits set by environmental law. The issue is with the fundamental
tenet of ecological democratization, that the number of individuals included, and
their treatment, should be optimum with respect to the achievement of the
environmental implementation society desires. SLAPP has to be resolved,
whether by greater First Amendment protection through the courts, by
legislation, by referendum, or by counter-SLAPP suits. SLAPP is killing off civic
involvement and activism at many levels throughout society. SLAPP solutions
Concept flrauniy. The Negation ofEqua'&yandAccountabi4y Underthe Law, 24 I-IoFsTRA L. REV. 981,
1042 (1996).
26. Id
27. Id
28. Id at 1058.
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must be the foremost priority for green legal professionalism to protect the
franchise that is basic to ecological democratization in many issues, especially
land use and siting decisions.
One possibility is to accord SLAPP defendants the protection of attorneys'
fees should they prevail, and posting of bond or cash by SLAPP plaintiffs in
security of recovery of funds for the defense. Such a provision might resemble
ones where the court may require filing of a bond or equivalent security for
attorney and expert witness fees if a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction is sought. -2 Professionalism dialogue over proposals such as this may
at least lead to a number of reforms. One such reform may concern remedies to
limit them to injunctive relief designed to prevent damages in the event an
economic entity were disparaged.
Turning to the proponents of SLAPP, it is true that NIMBYs, or persons who
say "Not In My Back Yard" to proposed developments, can sometimes use
environmental provisions to delay and frustrate persons who ultimately have the
right to do as they propose. The right to use the provisions of law to protect
one's back yard is of course basic in our system. But the concept that it is
necessary in order to protect the rights of developers, to be able to wage a
SLAPP suit, in which a developer may claim millions of dollars in damages
because someone wrote a letter or spoke their mind at a civic meeting about the
developer's traits, is wholly flawed.
What of a situation where someone simply dislikes a development or activity
that is within all the environmental regulatory restraints, and has been given
NEPA-like consideration of environmental impacts, but still requires
permissions. Delay in obtaining permits will be expensive to industry or
development, perhaps critically so. While many strategic citizen suits may
exercise a right to challenge, even though success on the merits is extremely
unlikely, if resultant delay will make a project too expensive to pursue, the suit
may be considered a strategic success. Objectors can exact a heavy cost. But
such activities abuse the environmental goals of society. These make-them-jump-
through-hoops suits are the other side of the coin. Solutions involve expedited
procedures to afford professionalism checks upon the citizens' side of the issues.
Unquestionably, suits of delay place business at enmity with environmentalists.
The environmentalists begin such suits because they feel disempowered and left
out of legal processes with embedded political imbalances.
The point is that in a deliberative democracy, *there is less of a need for the
strategic-delay suit than the SLAPP suit. Each interest is treated in a deliberative
approach and the process itself earns great respect. If the process is
democratization, it is likely both sides will let reforms eliminate such extreme
behaviors. A reciprocal solution can be fostered in a professionalism based upon
democratization.
29. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6972(c) (2000).
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B. The Range of Issues Participants A r Allowed to Address: Trade Expropriation
Dryzek calls scope "the range of issues which are subject to popular
control."3"' In citizens suits, scope is the subject matter allowed (under the
provisions of the statutes or the courts' rulings) to be addressed. The least
amount of scope is where environmental law is swept aside by a raw free-market
provision, and thereby precluded from consideration.
3 1
One of the greatest threats to sustainable environmental quality is the failure
to build protections into international trade agreements.3 2 However great the
threat from the recent history of the three-nation North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) agreement-making, newer trade proposals ominously
threaten to disable environmental provisions even more comprehensively. A
NAFTA result has already been "probably the largest single 'takings' case in U.S.
history," brought over regulation of a gasoline additive.3 ' The trade proposals
have given rise not only to the prospect of globalizing the takings doctrine, but
expanding it. This is done by changing from a takings doctrine generally
applicable to real property, and including broadly defined investments, without
connection to real property at all.'
The provisions of Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
address expropriation and compensation, providing the parties (U.S., Canada, and
Mexico) may not directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment
of an investor or a party in its territory, except for a public purpose, on a
nondiscriminatory basis, and under both fairness standards and on payment of
compensation.3" This last provision is of course the focal issue. Any measure
such as a law or regulation can be called into question as triggering the need for
compensation. "NAFTA does not require that these broadly-defined investor
30. POLITIC-S Of THE EARTH, supra note 6, at 109.
31. Such as preclusion of the Food and Drug Administration to regulate tobacco products.
See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
32. FLASHPOINTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICYMAKING: CONTROVERSIES IN ACHIEVING
SUSTAINABILrIY 2 (Sheldon Kamieniecki et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter FLASHrPOINTS]. The political
scientists in the extensive study of sustainability set out six "major flashpoints," of which
international trade and free trade is one. Id. at v-vi, 2. The analysis found the reason trade fails to
correctly address sustainability is that the need is not built into the trade codes, which may be
resolved by input of awareness and ethos to trade decisions. See id. at 338.
33. Joel C. Beauvais, Note, Regulatogy Expropriations Under NAFTA: Emerging P inciples &
Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 245, 245 (2002). The takings claim discussed is the
Metbanex case, an environmental dispute over use of a gasoline additive banned in California. The
claim is discussed also by Joseph A. Strazzeri, Note, A Lucas Anaysis of Regu/ato y Exprpriationr
UnderNAFTA Chapter Eleven, 14 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 837 (2002) and a number of cites
from Beauvais, supra, at 246 n.8 (critiquing NAFTA's Chapter 11).
34. Beauvais, spra note 33, at 266, 281-82.
35. North American Free Trade Agreement, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289, ch. 11.
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protections be balanced against competing social concerns, such as human rights,
environmental protection, or public health."36
For example, in the Florida Water Resources Act of 1972 the legislature
"revised the concepts of water law in Florida. Ownership of land [under the Act]
does not carry with it the ownership of water or even the right to use water. The
waters in the state are held in trust for the benefit of the people of the state."37
Use requires permits. Under NAFTA, it would be argued that Florida would be
unable to enact such a law today as the compensable effect on foreign investors
in real estate would preclude it. The globalization risk is from, for example, the
negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement for the Americas, perhaps a few years
away and involving thirty-four countries, not just the NAFTA three.
Negotiations for twenty-nine countries' Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI) were abandoned in 1998. Those negotiations could have meant verbatim
incorporation of the NAFTA expropriation language into MAI, in other words,
the provisions would have been extensively globalized.3 Also, proceedings for
compensation would be conducted by trade tribunals strongly criticized for being
insulated from public participation and scrutiny as they implement the trade law's
effects on environmental law."
Green legal professionalism approaches implementation of environmental law
through the strong processes of ecological democratization."1 Such processes are
necessary for our profession to deliver on the instruction of society to implement
all the many expectations and promises of our laws. Where those processes are
being cut away, we have a fundamental professionalism dilemma. Do we
advocate loyally for the processes necessary to all these environmental laws, or
do we stand by while they are, basically, repealed? Professionalism supports the
creation of national and international environmental law and regulations through
a democratic process. Professionalism cooperates with other institutions in
objection to the exemption of business activity from the processes of
environmental law.
36. Beauvais, smpra note 33, at 266.
37. Irene K. Quincey, History of Regulation of Consumptive Use, in FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTAl.
AND LAND USE LAW (The Florida Bar 2001).
38. The hemispheric negotiations are on-again-off-again and hard to predict. SeeChristopher
John Duncan, Recondhng U.S. Regulatoe Procedure with the WTO Reformulated Gasolne Case, in
RECONCILING ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 185 (Edith Brown Weiss & John H. Jackson eds.,
2001). Some websites keeping pace with them are the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
official website at http://www.ftaaalca.org, and various civil society organizations at http://
www.citizenstrade.org.
39. Beauvais, supra note 33, at 254-55.
40. Dryzek has applied the "burgeoning literature on deliberative democracy" to
environmental discourse, in his other writings. See DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, smpra note 6, at
7; Dryzek, supra note 6. The linkage to legal professionalism is the present author's.
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C. The Amount the Partidpants'Input is Genuinely in the Minds qf the Decision-makers
(Compared to Symbolic Inclusion): Objectivity in Sustainabili-y
In studying the problem of how to measure environmental risk so that
sustainability can be achieved, political scientists have commented that it is
political interests that interfere. Their suggested solution is methodologies can
be made essentially scientific rather than political.41
The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act42 provides
for sustainable yield. In particular, eight Regional Fishery Management Councils
develop plans to achieve and maintain, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield
(defined as the "maximum sustainable yield") from each fishery.43
An illustrative sequence occurred in the history of the law. The version of the
Act adopted in 1976 got the fisheries administration going, setting up the regional
councils to plan and manage, yet, it failed to prevent the measurable decline of
fisheries. Thus in 1996, amendments were adopted to build on the structure and
oblige effective plans.'" Then, application of the Act by courts obliged
management plans to adhere to the standard set for the maximum sustainable
yield. For example, a plan for summer flounder landings had only an 18%
likelihood of achieving the target, that is, it was over five times as likely to fail as
to succeed. The court found the Act required at least a 50% probability of
success.
45
The legal history of fisheries management demonstrates sustainability's power
as establishing a baseline, and providing for intergenerational effectiveness.
When the original baseline proved ineffective, new criteria were legislated. When
implementation lagged, citizen enforcement through the courts worked. The
very terms of the scientific quotas and fishery plans are set by sustainability.
46
Many battles will cause fisheries management to evolve, but the driving norm has
gone from free market to sustainability. The effect is an economic sustainability
basis, which consequentially also tends toward an ecological sustainability.
Describing conservative activist judges' effect on environmental law, the
National Resources Defense Council issued a report. The organization states the
choice is between anti-environmental activism or proper respect for the law. The
subject areas of this kind of activism, they report, are multiple. The commerce
41. George A. Gonzalez, Conclusion: Obstacles to Obtaining Sustainabii!' 335, 338, in
F"LASH IPOINT, supra note 32 (referring to Walter A. Rosenbaum, Reuation at Risk: The Controversial
Politics and Science of Comparative Risk Assessment also in FLAS-IPOINTS, supra note 32).
42. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000).
43. Id. 1851 (a)(1), 1854(b)(1).
44. Kristen M. Fletcher, Fix It! Constructing a Recommendation to the Ocean Commission for the
Future of Fisheries, 8 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 93,95-96 (2002).
45. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747,754-55 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
46. Shi-Ling Hsu &James E. Wilen, EcoystemManagementandthe 1996 Sustainable FirheriesAct,
24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799, 801-02 (1999).
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clause is used to prevent congress from acting. The takings clause is used to
force payment to polluters before they must end their pollution. The Eleventh
Amendment 47 is used to excuse state compliance with federal laws. Standing is
used as a barrier. Ideology of judges projects negatively in interpretation of the
intent of the laws.48
One aspect of genuine judicial decision-making in land-use cases is the
disclosure of why Justices select particular standards of review. Robert J.
Hopperton suggests an "entrenched expectation" should be that all opinions give
a "reasoned elaboration" for the basis of the standards they apply. Such a
"procedural expectation would obligate Justices to disclose their premises for
deploying deferential judicial review, or heightened judicial review, or activist
judicial review, etc., and to set forth their reasoning process" concerning the
selection.49 The disclosure process is seen as a helpful continuing remedy, but no
panacea. It works against many of the ways the merits of the cases fail to register
as needing redress. Without disclosure, the decision-makers are more likely to
fall into "personal predilections ... [e]rratic subjectivity of judgment, analytical
laxness, intellectual incoherence, the imagining of too much history, and the
manipulation of technical requirements." ''s Trade agreements extend concern
about adjudication into yet another dimension. The investor-state dispute
mechanism (ISDM) provisions of NAFTA, for example, use binding arbitration,
criticized for "institutional legitimacy and procedural safeguards" as the panels
for arbitration are not "a standing body of independent, professional judges" nor
does precedent bind the tribunals and "there is no general mechanism for
appeal," work being "largely insulated from public scrutiny or public
participation."5'
Others have proposed that courts in limited circumstances use their discretion
to shift the presumption of validity or constitutionality of a land-use decision.
This should occur, they say, where the courts see facially suspect patterns like
spot zoning or implausible departures from comprehensive plans. In those
circumstances, the local government would have a higher burden of justification
because of the evidence that the process had failed, and "something is amiss" in
the view of "sensible state judges, who often have extensive experience with
municipal politics."
5 2
47. U.S. CONST. amend. Xl.
48. SHARON BUCCINO ETAL,HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT: HOWACTIVISTJ UDG ESTHREATEN
OUR AIR, WATER, AND LAND (2001).
49. Robert J. Hopperton, Majontarian and Counter-Maoritarian Difficulte: Democrag, Distrust,
and Disclosure in Amencan Land-Use Junr*prudence--a Response to Professors Mandekr and Tarlock 's Rep#,
24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 541, 558 (1997).
50. Id at 559.
51. Beauvais, supra note 33, at 262-63.
52. Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Two CheersforShifiing the Prsumption of Vadty:
A Rep# to ProfessorHopperton, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 103,111 (1996).
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Many opportunities exist for delivery of objective standards and meaningful
review fitting the circumstances of environmental cases. These opportunities to
implement the goals of environmental law should be what professionalism
supports.
D. How Much Information and Expertise is Available to the Particpants: Housekeeping
Statutes
The general rights of citizens to access governmental information has a
perplexing exception: "when discovery entails a subpoena of governmental
agencies.""3 Most federal agencies, operating under the Housekeeping Statute,
have regulations limiting access to agency records and employee testimony. 5 The
regulations "commonly give the heads of agencies the power to refuse requests
for the testimony of agency employees. . . . The standards created by the
regulations to guide agency determinations .. .are extremely varied and ill-
defined" often leaving "unfettered discretion to affect the outcome of private
civil actions.""
"No compelling reason justifies singling out federal agencies and allowing
them virtually unrestrained discretion to avoid discovery requests for employee
testimony."5 6 "If an agency head decides not to allow a subordinate to testify,
private litigants in state court have many procedural hurdles to jump before they
can adequately challenge the agency head's determination.""
The proposed solution, offered by Jason C. Grech, is very direct. Federal
legislation could require "agencies to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
when reviewing requests for employee testimony." 8 Additionally, legislatively
granting federal courts jurisdiction to determine matters including sovereign
immunity and settling the "myth of a housekeeping privilege" are needed.5'
Given the expertise of federal environmental agency employees concerning
environmental citizen suits, whether in federal or state courts, green legal
professionalism should target the Housekeeping Statute as a priority for reform,
at least in the context of state and federal environmental citizen suits.
53. .Jason C. Grech, Note, Exxon Shipping, The Power To Subpoena FederalAgeny Emplyees,
and the HousekeepingStatute: Cleaning Up the Housekeeping Pri egeforthe Chimng-Sweepers Benefit, 37 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1996).
54. Id. at 1143.
55. Id at 1145-47
56. Id at 1181.
57. Id at 1151.
58. Id at 1181.
59. Id. at 1182.
[Vol. 10:527
2004] Environmental Legal Professionalism Adapted to Citizen Suit Processes 541
E. Whether the Qua/i y, Skill and Resources of the Participants Rises to the Level
Necessary in the Context: Attorney Fees
Attorney and expert witness fees are a dominating concern in determining the
quality, skill and resources of citizen suit practice. On the federal level, the
availability of fees under many environmental laws typically means that those
asserting public goals without financial self-interest may recover fees, and the
federal application when researched in 1990 had not meant awards against
unsuccessful public interest litigants."' This is despite the phrasing of the fee
provisions in statutes that imply any prevailing or substantially prevailing party
is entitled to fees; the legislative intent has been recognized to mean the fees are
intended for the plaintiffs who bring the citizen suits.6 '
The same is not necessarily true of state fee-shifting acts. For example, in
Florida the costs and attorney's fees are mandatory to the prevailing party, a
situation described as likely to have deterred the use of the plaintiffs' suit
provision itself and caused most public-interest parties to restrict themselves
either to interventions, since there is no fee liability provision in the intervention
portion of the statute, 2 or perhaps to administrative proceedings. The history
and interpretation of the Florida provisions are sparse and do not secure the
same comfort for use that many federal statutes provide.
It is hard to keep a public debate going. With environmental matters, there
are multiple debates and endless detail. Advantage tends to lean toward business.
As Sagoff describes it, "We hear on all sides that government is routinized,
mechanical, entrenched, and bureaucratized; the jargon alone is enough to
dissuade the most mettlesome meddler.
63
As Manus states, there are problems about the environmental movement's
future. He indicates "nature rarely has been championed by a truly powerful
political leader .... U.S. culture continues to grope for a sustainable nature
philosophy, something to serve as a polluter's conscience" when the laws are
inadequate, and the long-standing fear that "the public's pro-environment
60. Robert L. Boese, Labi'yforAttornys'Feesin EnvironmentalLihigation, 38 LA. B.J. 93,93-94
(1990).
61. Numerous federal environmental statutes containing such provisions are described by
Boese, supra note 60, at 94 n.6.
62. Carol A. Forthman, EnvironmentaIssrues, in FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY LITIGATION (2001)
(discussing section 403.412(2)( 0 of the Florida Statutes, which provides "the prevailing party or
parties shall be entitled to costs and attorneys fees" and may require posting of surety bond or cash
by plaintiffs. The statute has discretionary fees for NPDES actions).
63. Mark Sagoff, At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fitima, or Why PoliticalQuestions Are Not All
Economic, in EARTH ETHICs: ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC-s, ANIMAL RIGHTS, AND PRACTICAL
APPLICATIONS 372, 377 (ames P. Sterba ed., 1995).
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sentiment will regress, and that no sufficiently solid legal structure exists to carry
us through to the next surge" in the cycle of interest.'
The question for us is, we cannot generate enough controversy or even
enough attention to conciliation, for all the environmental activities present in a
boom-town world. We can do better, by applying our perspective of ecological
democracy. However, so much is still inadequate and unaddressed. The
population of the boom-town takes a long lag time to catch on and associate with
the vigors of public activity needed to defend the environment.
Political advisor Dick Morris has described the cycles bearing on social causes.
He finds times dictate whether to be aggressive or conciliatory. Morris' advice
for producing change in moderate times is to work incrementally, such as in the
private sector for gradual adoption of the goals. His example is the private sector
health care reform after national reform failed. Eventually consensus runs its
course, as new issues generate new controversies. These renew the "relevance"
of democracy.'
s
Examples of more incremental work can be seen in efforts to induce
compliance and tailor emissions trading, where political opposition has thwarted
more effective solutions like emissions taxes to get industry to internalize costs
and negative externalities. Or, where national security, due to violence, has
experienced difficulty accepting reasons to assist cultures and natural systems,
links to eco-cultural security can be made."'
The fickle nature of society's attention span for environmental issues means
strong support is required of the resources behind citizen suits. Attorney and
expert witness fees are particularly pressing to establish better enforcement under
state law.
IV. CALLS FOR CHANGE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL ETHIcs
In 1994, the President of the Environmental Law Institute, J. William Futrell,
stated the greatest achievement of the first twenty-five years of modern
environmental law has been codification of a change in ethical responsibilities to
the natural world, such as the National Environmental Policy Act's goals bearing
upon sustainability. He proposes, "[djuring the next twenty-five years, the most
important development in environmental law will be to implement that ethical
advance as practitioners counsel reluctant clients, many of whom do not share
64. Peter Manus, One Hundred Years of Green: A Legal Perspective on Three Twentieth Centuy
Nature Philosophers, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 557, 560 (1998).
65. DICK MORRIS, THE NEW PRINCE: MACHIAVELLI UPDATED FORTHE TWENTY-FIRS-I'
CENTURY 71-81 (1999).
66. Robert 0. Vos, Introduction: Competing Approaches to Sustainali'': Dimension of Controversy,
in FLASHPOINTS, supra note 32 (giving examples of partial solutions to critical issues ill
sustainability.) The eco-cultural linkage has gotten much attention, for example, at the World
Economic Forum, Poverty Breeds Teror, Forum Told, TiIE HERALD (Miami) Feb. 2, 2002, at 14A.
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in the vision of Earth Day." 7  He looks toward closing the gap between
environmental ethics (a general subject) and legal professional conduct if society
is to meet the intent of national environmental statutes.'"
Futrell's call is for guidance "on how to resolve the conflicting demands of
client advocacy and protection of the public interest in environmental
protection. '6' He seeks to bridge environmental ethics with environmental
lawyers' professional responsibility by recognizing a special category of
professional responsibility for environmental law. As professional responsibility
needs to accept the moral value as set by notable statutory formulations, Futrell
would revise the various jurisdictions' professional responsibility codes governing
attorneys to provide for those expressions. He asserts there is a community
value that is set and knowable, with an expression of the social value for law
being stronger regard for the public interest.' He indicates, "Future
developments in legal ethics should adopt the vast change in social values of the
last twenty-five years as reflected in the development of environmental ethics."'"
Futrell is seeking to inspire responsive development of the particulars of this
ethical guidance.
As expressed by Christopher D. Stone, when he embarks on exploring the
frameworks for moral considerateness, the fields of law and morality separate but
are related:
we have to disengage more carefully the legal aspects of our inquiry from the moral.
While law and morals share common roots, functions, and often subject matter,
their emphases are different. In morals, the emphasis is on generating and
justifying general standards of conduct. In law, the emphasis is on authoritatively
implementing some of the standards for which morality has spoken.72
Stone helps describe the separation further: "How we arrange our affairs so that
the future we choose is the future that becomes the reality: that is the question
of social institutions, of [the] law."73
There is a larger frustration with the field of professionalism than merely
environmental law's expressions of what it should do but is not yet doing. A
postmodern call-to-arms is sounded by Baron and Greenstein's dissection of the
field of lawyers' professional responsibility. They depict that field today as part
of the autonomous discipline of law, separated even from other fields of law, and
generally disengaged from moral considerations, in pursuit of client goals. It has
become a legalistic construction, the law governing lawyers, the regulation of
67. Futrell, supra note 14, at 825.
68. Id
69. Id. at 837-38.
70. Id. at 839.
71. Id at 838.
72. STONE, supra note 2, at 41.
73. Id. at 15-16.
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lawyers, the disciplinary rules, alternatively named "legal ethics. '74 Baron and
Greenstein search for where morality or ordinary ethics intersects this field.
Instead of connection, they identify mainly a disconnect. Ethical neutrality is at
the heart of the lawyer's craft, they say, under contemporary construction. Yet,
they find legal practice decisions result in moral impacts, illustrating with an
environmental example of one neighborhood treated positively while a less
influential neighborhood has the undesirable land uses shift onto it.75 The client-
serving choices of policy argued during cases haphazardly encode moral
positions. Baron and Greenstein end with a rejection of the dominant
construction and a plea for "incisive and relentless critique" so that eventually,
an alternative construction may emerge. 76 Baron and Greenstein do not offer an
alternative construction of legal professional responsibility themselves, but
endeavor to point the way by showing the need.77
Futrell similarly describes the lawyer's disconnect, and its reasons. Most of the
state professional codes of responsibility or conduct are built around the
adversarial model, designed to encompass, for instance, a criminal defendants'
basically stonewalling the government in order to assert innocence. The
underlying premise of professional codes is: "Lawyers should subsume their
personal ethical beliefs and moral stances to the positions that zealous advocacy
of their clients'interests require."7' He indicates, "There is little guidance on how
legal ethics meshes with environmental ethics." 9 Perhaps a little foray to remind
us of how society generally regards environmental ethics is necessary to set up
the mesh with legal ethics that we need to construct.
V. SociETY EXPECTS LAW TO BRING ABOUT ITS ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC
It is not necessary or likely possible to exactly select, or even precisely define,
the formulation of society's intent, in order to apply green legal professionalism.
Recognizing the existence of a generalized, common expectation of an
environmental quality is enough. It is valuable to realize that society has the
expectation despite the offered criticism to any particular expression of an
environmental ethic. And we can realize that competing formulations such as
particularly wholly unrestrained free market are discredited in society and do not
represent the intent of society because they could not lead us to a resultant
environmental quality acceptable to society. The point is that it is possible in
current environmental dialogue to recognize that a community or cultural
74. Jane B. Baron & Richard K. Greenstein, Constructing the Field of Professional Responsibii'y,
15 NYTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHIC.S & PUB. POL'Y 37,38 (2001).
75. Id at 69.
76. Id at 98.
77. Id. at 97-98.
78. Futrel, supra note 14, at 835.
79. Id. at 836.
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standard exists akin to one or another or the sum of the concepts discussed
below, and that this community standard addresses and accounts for society's
other goals, such as economic ones, as well.
The formulations of intent are at the core, or part of the conscience, of what
professionalism must ultimately achieve. Constant reference and comparison to
them is made to analyze and remedy errant processes in the legal system. By
considering formulation of intent, the distortions of the processes that produce
such harmful results for the environment are often apparent.
The following formulations are among the environmental value statements
that most people living in technological society have heard about. Their ideas are
common currency in our culture, not just among environmental lawyers or
persons with active business involvement or higher education. Green
professionalism works from the perspective that it is a general overlay under
which ecological democratization is applied, and rejects the idea that a pure
selfishly-based free market should control environmental decisions in a
deliberative democracy. These concepts are the notable prescriptions of society's
environmental ethic, which lawyers should weigh in making many
professionalism choices in their active practice. They tie into the ecological
democratization processes that are described above.
The Community Value Criteria qf General Environmental Ethics- In popular terms,
the environmental ethic of society is frequently expressed as "community value."
Usually disciplines evaluating for an environmental ethic select it as an essential
term.m'
For instance, a group of political scientists has evaluated critical problems in
environmental sustainability.8 ' In their summary, George A. Gonzalez traces the
restrictive design of our political system as the explanation for what now chokes
efforts for sustainability. That design accords bias. An elevated status for
industry (or business) exists in the governmental system. And, that status
operates under the principle of free "unremitting" pursuit of self-interest.8 2 State
behavior (such as industry regulation) is viewed suspiciously. It is characterized
as being limited. In classification terms, this is known as Lockean liberalism, or
a liberal (rights-based) norm that founds government on the protection of
property and wealth gathered by self-interested actions. Its free-market ethic
views the marketplace's price signals and technology as the efficient response to
resource depletion. This is the traditional view of industries."3
In our current system, liberals and conservatives may vary on how unremitting
the pursuit is allowed to be, but share in its support in a general sense when their
political processes are driven by campaign contributions, lobbyist influences, and
the importance of wealth in the system. These make the necessary result of
80. POLITICS OF THE EARTH, supra note 6, at 200.
81. FLASHPOINTS, supra note 32.
82. Gonzalez, supra note 41, at 341.
83. Id. at 342-46.
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sustainability very hard to achieve. Pared down to specifics, the group studied
six sustainability issues as "flashpoints" to find reasons for failure of
sustainability, and to suggest prospects for partial correction in the Lockean
liberalism system."4
Gonzalez's summary discusses the call for a "competing discourse." The basis
is the concept that environmental goals usually need a community-interest basis.
This competing discourse of "community interest," must encompass and
reconcile with community interests in property rights and reluctance to
reconfigure the economy.8"
Ethicists examining the political and legal system urge the same solution. To
Mark Sagoff, market-based policy is indifferent toward value, "an indifference so
deep, so studied, and so assured that at first one hesitates to call it by its right
name.""6 It is the neutrality of the economist. "Those who are willing to pay the
most... have the right view; theirs is the more informed opinion, the better
aesthetic judgment, and the deeper moral insight."" Efficiency, or maximization
of wealth, or economic optimization, is the criterion. But issues of public safety
and health, social relations and environment, involve matters of knowledge,
wisdom, morality, and taste. They also involve other principles. These are
"community" or "public" values or philosophy. When instilled with "sensible
recognition of economic constraints," they are the "moral function of public
law."
88
Dryzek, like Gonzalez and Sagoff, stresses community value, findingit phrases
the ethical standard society espouses. It is probably the most common
articulation of society's environmental ethic.8"
National Environmental Statutes' Expressions qf lntent. Futrell's assertion that the
national environmental statutes give guidance of the ethical intent for a revised
code of professional ethics has much backing in the statutes he cites, yet it is
open to question. Not all surveyors of those laws, however, agree that there is
a coherent approach to be found in those sources. These laws only roughly
express what Futrell terms, the "ethical norms agreed on by the majority. ' 90
They are the product of our political system, and the statements of intent are
84. Gonzalez, supra note 41, at 341-43.
85. Id. at 341-43 (discussing MATTHEW A. CAHN, ENVIRONMENTAL DECElrIONS: THE
TENSIONS BETWEEN LIBERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICYMAKING IN TIlE UNITED STAIFS
(1995)).
86. Sagoff, spra note 63, at 380.
87. Id at 378.
88. Id at 380-81.
89. As Dryzek states, "deliberative authenticity exists to the extent that communication
induces reflection on preferences in non-coercive fashion." DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra
note 6, at 76. The "values that can survive authentic democratic debate are those oriented to the
interests of the community as a whole." POLITICGS 0F TIHE EARTH, supra note 6, at 200.
90. lutreU, spra note 14, at 839.
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often more noble in prose than the accompanying substantive provisions are in
content. The particulars of how ethics codes might use these principles is not
developed in Futrell's article. Futrell presents the premise that the moral value
is in a larger sense fixed for us by these laws. They certainly express the cultural
aspiration in a larger sense, famously linking great concepts to resources and
needs, like fishable and swimable waters, or consideration for irretrievable loss
or for impact to the human environment."'
Sustainabili . One way our society frames the cultural aspirations is the term
sustainability:
The concept of "sustainability" has become a hotly contested domain within
public discourse. One critic has even written that "Sustainable development is in
real danger of becoming a cliche like 'appropriate technology' - a fashionable
phrase that everyone pays homage to but nobody cares to define" (Lele 1991, p.
607). Indeed, the very word "sustainable" can be found in many phrases with
starkly different implications: "sustainable growth", "sustainable yield", "sustainable
societies", and "sustainable development". The idea of sustainability functions as
what Baudrillard (1993) calls a "floating-signifier" in that it masks underlying
disagreement, can function differently in varying contexts, and may finally lose
relevance to concrete policy choices.
But it would be a mistake to dismiss the idea of sustainability prematurely.
There are at least two reasons why the idea of sustainability has proven such a
powerful force in shaping discourse about the environment. First, the role of
sustainability as a "floating-signifier" provides common ground for parties with
deeply opposed interests to search for agreement. Any agreement forged about the
content of "sustainability" would offer a powerful benchmark for evaluating
difficult policy choices. Second, the notion of sustainability raises crucial issues of
intergenerational justice that place environmentalists in a stronger position in
relation to the American (Lockean) Liberal tradition (e.g., Gore 1992). At its best,
therefore, an expanding discourse of sustainability may lead to a more integrated
(in the sense of ecological systems) and long-term view of the environmental
problematic.92
So we get two outcomes of dealing with environmental issues in terms of
sustainability-benchmark and intergenerational consideration.
Sustainability is not a precise ethical standard because it is a floating signifier.
An intense search, involving huge studies and millions of dollars, concludes that
sustainability is after all, undefinable. "[D]ifferent interests with different
substantive concerns" have tried "to stake their claims in the sustainable
development territory" because "astute actors recognize that the terms of this
discourse should be cast in terms favorable to them."" Like Gonzalez, Dryzek
sees the discourse as an important concept to be contested politically. He views
91. Futrell, supra note 14, at 839-40. See alro 33 U.S.C. 1251(a) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 4322
(2000)
92. Vos, supra note 66, at 3-4.
93. POLITIC- OFTHE EARTH, spra note 6, at 124.
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sustainability to be emerging as the primary focus when it comes to (especially
global) environmental affairs. It re-conceptualizes the terms of environmental
dispute. Collective efforts are required for it to achieve its goals. 4
And, the variant of the term as "sustainable development" carries forward the
aspirations of the Earth Summit (United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, which are amply known and
discussed in law, public policy, and economics. The term has been defined as
"human development that is ecologically sustainable" with its aims being "human
freedom, opportunity, and higher quality of life.""5 However, "[i]t is not another
name for economic development, although it includes economic development,"
and the wide-ranging steps needed to further the many dimensions of sustainable
development have been extensively described. 6
Theories of Property Law: Green Wood, Norms, Web of Interestr. One of the green
property theories is "green wood", a theory of property law advanced by Robert
J. Goldstein grafting environmental ethics and ecology into real property law.
97
Goldstein approaches the "bundle of sticks" concept that real property consists
of a set of rights that are divisible, such as the right to exclude others or the right
to transfer. Land always relates to neighboring property, such as its need for
access, water, adjacent support, fire prevention, light, air, or nuisance prevention.
Lockean theory encompasses this concept although emphasizing the economic
rights in property. With modern society's acceptance of the interdependence of
properties to sustain the environment, Goldstein essentially takes aim at the
mind-set of property law.'"
Goldstein articulates the respect owed to the "environmental context" of each
piece of land. 9 He would view the context as integral to the rights. Impliedly at
least, his formulation tells the status of economic value to move over to make
room for the status of environmental context. Alteration to land must not
disrupt the context. Goldstein's aim is particularly at common law. His
application is to directly instill substantive decisions about property with the
responsibility to maintain the environmental context of the land.""
In essence, Goldstein takes one step further the NEPA-like approach to
identifying the inter-generational or community value. Noting that NEPA is
procedural, he extracts the fruit of the procedural inquiry that describes the value
or context of the property involved. Rather than leaving that fruit at the disposal
of an agency, Goldstein inserts it into the substantive decision. For government
94. POLITICS OF THE EARTH, supra note 6, at 125.
95. John C. Dernbach, Synthesis, in STUMBLING TOWARD SUS'TAINABILITY 1, 5 (John C.
Dernbach ed., 2002).
96. Id. at 5-6.
97. Goldstein, supra note 18.
98. Id. at 404-05.
99. Id. at 380, 385, 403.
100. Id. at 410.
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permits and actions, he foresees ready application. The identified environmental
context of the property involved must be maintained. His examples are mining
or a landfill use adjacent to fragile publicly protected natural areas. Government
permissions for context-altering activities would be prevented.""
The green wood inquiry adds to the range of issues allowed or required to be
addressed. Goldstein presents it as a question for property law's bundle of
sticks. 112 But many decisions affecting the environment could be overlaid with
a consideration in the nature of a green wood standard of general environmental
ethics and ecology.
However, the bundle of sticks approach to property is insecure as a
conception of property. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold presents a "replacement
of the metaphor of property as a bundle of rights with a metaphor of property
as a web of interests," viewing interest holders as connected to one another and
to the object owned." 3 The conception addresses environmental ethics, and
addresses the current understanding of property as a legal topic in
metamorphosis, considering property's several attributes (its distinctiveness,
interconnectedness, functionality, and context).
Similarly, to address land and water use and ecosystem interactions, revision
of traditional property norms has been described by Lynda L. Butler. An
adaptive conception of property is proposed, "tak[ing] into account the impact
of property use on ecological and other common systems.""' The "scales of
land use" recognizing landowner environmental responsibility would be
incorporated into the formula of rights, powers, duties and liabilities for
property.' These impact on the scope of constitutional rights, assisting the non-
economic aspects. There is an effort for judicial recognition of a sustainable and
adaptive view of property, and its associated ecological conditions, with spatial
and temporal dimensions. As private property piggybacks use of common
environmental resources and property norms are redefined, more than nuisance
theory should apply.
These proposals are anticipated by what Terry W. Frazier calls Green
Property, a name derived from the Green social movement that seeks to change
modern culture's interactions with nature.' A more or less comprehensive
organization of the ideas of property reform, away from classical liberal property
101. Goldstein, supra note 18, at 428-29.
102. Id. at 430.
103. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Recontritution of Propert4: Property as a leb of Interests, 26
H-ARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 281, 284 (2002).
104. Lynda L. Butler, The Pathology of PropertyNorms: Living Within Nature's Boundaies, 73 S. CAL.
L. REiw. 927,1015 (2000).
105. Id
106. "Terry W. Frazier, The Green Alternative to Classicaliberal Property Theory, 20 VT. L. REV.
299, 300-03 (1995).
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theory, is presented by Frazier, particularly to elicit common themes and
interdependent ideas utilizing ecological principles.
Whatever ways real property law may now be evolving, there appears to be
theoretical support for having the property rights account for the land's
environmental context. Goldstein feels it is society's view already and the
common law is willing to accept it.
Precaumionagy Pntinples: To address the "moral prescription" or embedded
ethical framework in the legal responses to environmental issues, Prue Taylor
examines the ethics embedded in international provisions addressing climate
change. 7 In the "precautionary approach" as defined in Article 3 of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), Taylor finds the
approach is laden with economic values when addressing cost-to-benefit analysis,
giving economic rationale an absolute dominance.""8 This approach is then
starkly contrasted to "precautionary principles" which would base protection of
the earth's climate system on scientific factors, erring on the side of caution. The
consequence of the FCCC approach is to widely miss the target set by the
scientific community for reduction in greenhouse gases by almost twelve times,
and to do so twenty years later, perhaps catastrophically."'
Why is it that green legal professionalism would accept the precautionary
"principles" and reject the precautionary "approach"? As Dryzek explains,
democratization by discourse or deliberation seeks to achieve results that persons
(without self-interested bias) could accept upon reflection as correct courses of
conduct."" In the greenhouse gas example, the "approach" would not convince
unbiased individuals that it would achieve the social goal.
The analysis sets out, in effect, an exemplary green legal professionalism
inquiry. Standard of proof, and burden of proof, and the objective of balancing
of factors, are addressed. Taylor urges a broad "scope of analysis," to include
both economic and non-economic factors, with health taking precedence over
economics, and inquiry to the range of options and their public acceptability."'
Taylor points out the burden of proving environmental harm should not be
placed on the contesting party. Rather, it must be on the initiator of change, or
the policy and decision makers, including "transparent and participatory
processes" to make choices." 2
Like Goldstein's green wood theory, or Butler's property norms, Taylor
attacks the notion of immutable property rights, and argues that property rights
107. Prue Taylor, Heads in the Sand as the Tide Rises: Entironmental Ethics and the Law on Cmate
Change, 19 UCLAJ. ENVTL L. & PoL'Y 247, 250 (2000/2001).
108. Id at 251-54.
109. Id. at 256-59.
110. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 1-2.
111. Taylor, supra note 107, at 256.
112. Id
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must be viewed as having associated ecological responsibilities. Taylor urges
public awareness of such limitation of property rights.
11 .
Ecological Science and Perhaps Adaptive Management Adaptive management is
promoted by A. Daniel Tarlock. As laid out by Tarlock, traditional
environmental law uses a value pluralism, switching the argument for a particular
regulation to one of several constructs." 4 For instance, some may use a "balance
of nature" land ethic. Others may argue for a deep ecology ethic, to view nature
and humans with equal moral standing. Still others on the ethical continuum
claim an ecological science ethic which views natural resources as finite, and so
requiring human intervention to enable the natural systems that support life. For
some the alternative is science, as evolved into regulatory science. Although
Tarlock does not present science as an ethical expression, ethicists would say
accepting scientific principles accepts them as a value, which is an ethical
expression.s115
Tarlock disdains efforts to justify environmental action from an ethical basis
when the scientific basis is not sufficient. He looks to science, not ethics, to
inform environmental law. He disdains re-casting property rights on a natural
rights basis in order to justify environmental law. He describes environmentalism
as a breakaway from traditional legal values: it is relatively difficult to integrate
environmentalism into the legal system, as it is a product of externalities, and asks
for human subordination to future generations and ecosystems. Rather than
accord standing to these generations or ecosystems, he impliedly argues against
the idea by describing their lack of legal personality and blasts the usual scientific
basis of environmental law."
16
Tarlock's environmental law would elevate "more hard-edged probabilistic
theories of non-equilibrium.' 1 7 That is, he recognizes that science has changed.
Ecosystems are viewed as dynamic, changing, in flux, unbalanced features.
Processes are what produce undisturbed systems, so the goal is adaptive
management with feedback loops for new information to alter policy. Policy
becomes a sort of adjustable experiment, making the probability range estimated,
and causing mid-course adjustments while the activities are ongoing. This means
decisions have less finality than the legal system (and the static view of
ecosystems) traditionally expects. " '
Tarlock addresses postmodern scientific methods, particularly for ecological
science. He takes aim at the static models of early modem scientific responses.
He bemoans the growth of regulatory science where usual methods of scientific
113. Taylor, supra note 107, at 257.
114. A. Dan Tarlock, EnironmentalLaw: Ethics or Sdence?, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & P0)L'Y F. 193,
195-97 (1996).
115. See, e.,g., id. at 200 n.29.
116. Id at 215-16.
117. Id at 201.
118. Id. at 205-06.
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experiment are squashed into a regulatory agenda, timetable and design, foreign
to scientific validity. He stresses the need for flexibility as environmental
protection is implemented to account for input of new information and the
natural variability of ecosystems themselves. He advocates this kind of adaptive
management." '
Tarlock's ideas'2'" on one hand seem to make the most scientific sense, yet they
seem also to launch everything into endless argument, which could never be
sustained. But basing environmental decisions on science is an important feature
to diminishing the influence of politics where objectivity is necessary. As
Gonzalez states, the increase of scientific methodologies is a beneficial solution
to the problem of political interference with measurement of environmental risk,
for example.' 2'
The Spectrum qf Green Philosophies: Most people today do not go about with the
self-identity of a particular secular philosophy, such as stoics or epicureans. Most
have a religious affiliation. But they would not self-describe as being much more
than "animal lovers" or fitting under a general label like "environmentalist."
However, there are sets of green philosophies, perhaps constellations of them,
almost like there are many varieties of vegetarians. Vegetarians may be easier to
explain. Some eat no animal products, some have no genetically modified plants
either, others eat dairy and eggs, others eat fish or shellfish, and there are
occasional exceptions made by some, or restriction to range-raised or organic
sources.
Seemingly every possible permutation and combination of an earth ethic has
been extracted from studies made of activists and economic forces. Most earth
ethics form both a philosophy and a political discourse. Survivalism,
Prometheanism, administrative rationalism, democratic pragmatism, economic
rationalism, sustainable development, ecological modernization, green
romanticism (such as deep ecology), and green rationalism, among others, are
analyzed byJohn Dryzek.1' -
Religions' Tenets Regarding Nature: In keeping with the times, the teachings
toward nature of all of the major world religions are being discussed. Most begin
with the reminder that nature is God's design and creation. Some urge the
portions of teachings instructing humans to conquer nature and others point out
how those teachings have been countered, for example, with Biblical narrative
about stewardship and point out that some humans-over-nature references
119. Tarlock, spra note 114, at 220.
120. Tarlock credits the adaptive management scientific ideas of ecologist, Daniel B. Botkin.
See DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (1990).
121. FLASHPOINTS, spra note 32, at 337.
122. POLITICS OF THE EARTH, supra note 6, at Chapters 2-10 (discussing each in turn).
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involve excerpts while fuller reading of the passages produces a care-giver
message.
2
-
VI. WI-Y THE PROFESSIONAL CODES ARE UNPRODUCTIVE FOR LEGAL
ETHIcs PROVISIONS ON THE ENVIRONMENT
The effort to establish an "environmental right" has also eluded professional
codes, including legal professional ones. Many professional organizations have
ethical codes. For example, the American Society for Public Administration and
the International Association of Chiefs of Police both have ethical codes. 24
Agencies are involved with issues like conflicts of interest, bribery, or competitive
bidding. Administrative agency ethics consist of three main categories:
(1) codes of ethics, including laws, professional rules, and whistle-blower statutes;
(2) what might be called ethics police, with specific responsibilities to oversee
ethical standards; and (3) cultural strategies, efforts to forge organizational climates
conducive to ethical behavior. Though all have proved useful in some respects,
none can be considered fully satisfactory, at least not in the sense that it alone can
be expected to ensure organizational morality. Codes of ethics need to work hand
in hand with proactive managerial strategies, which in turn need to be bolstered by
external checks on behavior.2
Codes that are "clearly embraced by top agency management and embedded
in an ethical organizational culture are more likely to win respect."' 26 They "need
to work hand in hand with proactive managerial strategies, which in turn need to
be bolstered by external checks on behavior."' 2' Codes, laws, external monitors,
and organizational climates all play a role in public administration ethics.
However, there is no prospect of a morally perfect organization of human beings.
Ethical behavior is of uncertain derivations, it may stem from character,
organization, or culture. 28
Some professional organizations set environmental ethics in their codes of
professional conduct, although in generalities. Palmer discusses some excerpts
123. Examples of legal discussion of religious interpretations are found in Chuck D. Barlow,
Why the Christian Right Must Protect the Environment Theocentriciy in the Poltical Workplace, 23 B.C.
ENvTL. AFr. L. REV. 781 (1996) and Richard H. Hiers, Reverencefor Life and Environmental Ethics in
BibficalLaw and Covenant, 13J.L. & RELIGION 127 (1996-1998), which work carefully through often-
quoted passages to show the environmental context of the teachings.
124. See American Society for Public Administration, at http://www.aspanet.org (last visited
Sept. 8,2003); International Association of Chiefs of Police, athttp://www.theiacp.org (last visited
Sept. 8, 2003).
125. Mark W. Huddleston &Joseph C. Sands, EnforingAdministrative Ethics, 537 ANNA-S AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 139 (1995).
126. Id. at 143.
127. Id. at 149.
128. Id. at 140.
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from architects and engineers. She expresses surprise that more has not been
done with professional codes of conduct.'29 The legal profession is position-
neutral in most professional codes, but education and competency intensive.
While the legal profession needs to establish an environmental professionalism
approach, it should not omit to prod related professions into similar activity.
Clients should not avoid lawyer involvement because of its heightened ethical
considerations, only to use technical professionals such as engineers or planners
preferentially for advice stemming from traditional considerations.
Probably the best known proposal for a revision of industrial ethics are the
CERES principles, formerly known as the Valdez principles, as they arose after
the Exxon Valdez oil spill.'3" The principles are meant to set the pace for ethical
approaches of industries. These are promoted by the Coalition for
Environmentally Responsible Economies. 3 ' The principles recognize corporate
responsibility for future generations and touch on contexts like wilderness,
biodiversity, health, and finite resources. Significantly, they couple with public
records provisions about environmental aspects of industry, linking "an
environmental ethic with the idea of freedom of information."'3 2 The goal is to
have specific industries adopt the principles. Palmer recognizes these principles
as based on stewardship for future generations.'33
More general, and including the sustainability concept of future generations,
are the International Chamber of Commerce's Business Charter for Sustainable
Development. High-ranking among industries is IBM in terms of relatively more
specific corporate policies, for reasons of detail and statement of the ethical basis
for the policies. 34 However, Palmer cautions that industrial policies may be
public relations exploitations, ignored in practice and especially when
inconvenient to the overall corporate interests. External control on backsliding
is usually lacking. Challenged industries are not likely to be the ones using such
approaches, or even if they have such approaches, they have them as
"greenwash" and they are not enforced where other company goals are
dominant."'
While environmental philosopher John S. Dryzek agrees decisions in our
political system are driven by the self-interested market, he also notes ecological
modernization works economic development and environmental protection
together. Some developmental interests have reason to resist environmental
harm. It interferes with their production. It defers expenses to cost them more
129. CLARE PALMER, ENVIRONMENTAL Ehi*i(-s 136 (1997).
130. See Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies, athttp://www.ceres.org (last
visited Sept. 8, 2004).
131. Id.
132. PALMER, sthra note 129, at 128.
133. Id
134. Id. at 133-34.
135. Id at 138-39.
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in the future. It affects workers who would produce better by living in a clean
environment. It fails to tap the consumer market for green-produced products.
So they commit to conservation and economic efficiency.1"6 Futrell describes the
new profession of environmental management's many techniques to cut even the
use of polluting processes."' The resultant union of a clean environment and
economic success is a familiar theme.
Green legal ethics is really an aspect of legal professionalism, rather than a
matter for the subject of "legal ethics." The term legal ethics usually refers to the
disciplinary minimum standards of allowed conduct usually called the ethics code.
It is ludicrous to expect an ethical rule could require attorneys to protect the
environment or embrace any formulation of society's environmental ethic per se.
For that reason, professionalism is the subject matter to address, even though
in lay terms it means ethics. A description, for example, is that "[p]rofessionalism
is largely a matter of attitude and discussion of the attitudes and values held by
modem lawyers is essential if we are to resolve some of the critical issues facing
our profession today.""13 "Professionalism differs from ethics in the sense that
ethics is a minimum standard . . . while professionalism is a higher standard
expected of all lawyers. Professionalism imposes no official sanctions. It offers
no official reward. Yet, sanctions and rewards exist unofficially. . ." such as in
one's self-respect and sense of right.'39
Blan Teagle, Director of the Center for Professionalism at the Florida Bar, has
his own unofficial version of a definition of professionalism and distinction of
legal ethics.)" Legal ethics addresses the Black Letter rules of compliance, where
categories are made and principles stated for conceptual clarity. Legal ethics is
often mixed into professionalism, overlapping as in a vin diagram. It involves
substantive rules of practice. However, professionalism does not have fixed
categories. Teagle describes it as a process approach to moral decisionmaking,
where Black Letter law takes you only so far and then you must decide the matter
by applying "community standards" or "community core values," which he
believes to exist despite the critics. He looks at legal professionalism as a
"community of practice," where an inquiry starts with the legal ethics rules, then
letting the rules help frame the issues, and then reach the professionalism
application: the thought and feeling of how we should act is a process deserving
of time and effort. 41 The topics of traditional legal professionalism are all
practice-related ones, such as issues relative to the attorney-client relationship, the
136. POLITICS Or THE EARTH, spra note 6, at 142.
137. Futrell, supra note 14, at 834.
138. F. Perry Odum, Profisonalsrm-A Worthwhile Goal for Every Laoyer, in FLORIDA
ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE LAW 2.3-2 (The Florida Bar 2001).
139. Id. (quoting Harold G. Clarke, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia).
140. Blan Teagle, Remarks to the Florida Bar Continuing Legal Education Committee (Sept.
27, 2002).
141. Id.
Widener Law Review
lawyers' actions relating to the other parties' lawyers, personal conduct within the
profession, courtesy, cooperation, adequate preparation, helping those who
cannot afford an attorney, fees, and issues like substance abuse among
professionals.
The traditional professionalism topics leave out the additional topics
environmental law needs addressed, however. But the same concept of
professionalism applies: address thought and feeling to how we should act, from
application of community standards (here, the broader community of
environmental ethics and not only a community of practice).
VII. APPLICATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Another of the flashpoint issues of sustainability identified by the political
scientists is the provision for environmental justice.1 12 Lack of environmental
justice, they indicate, affects the legitimacy of goals of sustainability. They
indicate the frequent problem encountered is that failures of environmental
justice occur in complex settings, so that case study methods have struggled to
produce results. While they note the problem has been resolvable in some
superfund financial allocations for example, implementation is still a perplexing
issue in need of solutions. 4
It appears that green legal professionalism methods have a lot to offer to
environmental justice. Commentators have noted that consideration of
environmental justice is carried to most environmental agency decisions by
Executive Order.t" It can certainly be asserted that it is a part of the
formulations of all the environmental ethics our culture accepts, and necessarily
within the first part of Dryzek's evaluation for ecological democratization. 43 All
of the dimensions of ecological democratization seem to apply well to it. In fact,
they almost define what should be done to ensure environmental justice, as they
emphasize the inclusiveness and treatment of participants, their range of issues,
making information and expertise available, and enabling participants to match
the needs of the participation opportunity.
The need for environmental justice and justice of all kinds is a part of
professionalism, appropriate for activism by attorneys generally.
142. See FLASHPOINTS, supra note 32, at 155-78.
143. Id at 138.
144. Id at 150, 161-62.
145. Dryzek's franchise dimension of democratization involving "expansion of the number
of people capable of participating effectively in collective decision," and enabling their competence.
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, .rpra note 6, at 29.
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VIII. WHY GREEN LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM INSTEAD OF AN
"ENVIRONMENTAL RIG -IT"
While there is much achievement in the expansion of interests necessary for
status, the expansion falls far short of either standing or a substantive
"environmental right" for natural features, wildlife, or ecosystems. The quest for
these two features, standing and an environmental right, has occupied much of
the legal debate over ethical treatment in the law. It seems this debate is well
presented and considered, yet at something of a standstill. 14  Green
professionalism may assist the consideration for nature desired by the standing-
or-rights concepts, even where no compromised human interest is present.
Professor Stone's 1972 classic, "Should Trees Have Standing?," including the
foreword to the book edition,147 is the prototype of a green legal inquiry. He
describes "three criteria of a rights-holder" as lacking for natural objects: "They
have no standing in their own right; their unique damages do not count in
determining [the] outcome; and they are not the beneficiaries of awards."' 48 He
reflects on the tortured path that has established franchise for many parties who
previously had no standing: corporations and other fictitious persons, various
races, national origins, women, elderly, or prisoners. Eventually, courts or
constitutions or legislatures recognized their capacity to sue and be sued, where
it was once absent.49 He describes standing based on the derivative of members
of organizations, where members have rights impaired, such as recreation,
aesthetics, and conservation interests. And, he discusses representational ideas
of standing, for instance favoring the concept ofnon-governmental guardians for
natural objects, with the objects holding legal rights. 5" Writing a decade after
Should Trees Have Standing, Stone reflects how case law rapidly expanded so "the
environment's own standing has become more a matter of theoretical and
spiritual interest than a real practical constraint on the bringing of environmental
litigation."'' Further settlement of the law of standing has finally occurred
which confirms Stone's view, of course. So Stone turns his writing focus toward
"the reach of the law and morals generally."'
5 2
The search for ways to instill an environmental right into law has been a
lengthy struggle. Peter Manus looks at it from the viewpoint of leaders of the
146. See Manus, supra note 64, at 584, 673-74.
147. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREE-S HAVE STANDING?: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS
FORNATuRAL OBJECTS (Oceana Publishing 1996) (1972). This edition reprints the article from the
1972 Southern California Law Rtview with the foreword and appended opinions in Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972).
148. Id at 16.
149. Id at 4.
150. STONE, supra note 2, at 10.
151. Id at 10.
152. I at 11.
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environmental movement. He gives a wonderful depiction of the wayJ ohn Muir
and Rachel Carson saw the law address their view of the environment. They
endeavored to protect nature for its own sake, and wanted more from the law
than the law seems able to give. They, like the environmental philosophers,
wanted a right for nature of its own. Manus defines the "environmental right"
as "a legal basis for protecting the earth's interests where no human interest has
been compromised."'' 3 That is, where no property right, nuisance or tort claim
is protective. He flatly states the "notion" of this environmental right "evades
the law."'5 4 The rights have more substantive components than standing. Such
legal rights are held by legal entities, Manus indicates, when analyzed in the
Hohfeldian manner. Individuals or collected individuals such as corporations
always are required, and then, they are limited to the rights that derive through
property or tort constructions. The apparent impossibility of law to evolve an
"environmental right" leaves our political and moral choices to be made via
"new" tools, such as "societal avenues.' 5 5
Manus' Hohfeldian analysis finds that the environment ends up an item all are
free to enjoy or exploit as a privilege. But it lacks a right, for it is an area of
"social concern" destined to unprotected status. "Damnum absque injuria,"
harmed but without injury in a legal sense, is the category ascribed to nature.1 s'
Manus presents the example of the CERCLA program's concept of natural
resource damages (NRD). While NRD's implementation has floundered, the
concept is notable as Manus' best example of the codification of an
environmental right for nature. The privilege to exploit is the dominant
construction, and Manus points to Bill McKibben's view that "the law lacks
authority where problems are broad or far-reaching." Big environmental
problems with "vague and vast" injuries are ones the law does not get its arms
around. But there is a basic problem at any level:
The privilege to exploit nature and the status of having no right to prevent nature's
destruction are not negatives or omissions from the law, but are instead part of the
law, positive interests invoked and enjoyed by the protected class of polluters.
Nature is not out there, untouched by the law and ripe for being addressed. By not
including nature in the system of legal relations, the law has, in fact, addressed
nature, asserting that it is available for exploitation."7
Meanwhile, ecological science has moved on to view nature as more of a
flexible, disordered collection, much harder to resolve. Regulation endures
against backlash against command-and-control. Current culture expresses
153. Manus, supra note 64, at 673-74.
154. Id at 674.
155. Id at 644, 673, 674.
156. Id at 577-78.
157. Id. at 653.
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"environmentalism must evolve from something coerced to something
natural."'5 8
Manus sees some revisions aim for "an evolution in privilege." He defines
privilege as "a simple legal freedom to behave in a particular manner."'
5
Thus, Manus finds, without declaring it as an ethic, that our system of legal
relations contains an approach toward nature. The ethic is one of omission of
status or right. The resulting ethic serves nature up for exploitation, by denying
it rights in a system where lack of rights is conclusive. Nature's exploiters have
the privileges without the duty of restraint, as part of property freedoms. And law
is "anthropocentric" in dealing with nature, so it eventually accords persons with
protections but not non-human life or ecosystems."
The dual negatives are: no environmental right, and no status to assert legal
claims of non-persons. These persist. If there were a right to a functioning
ecosystem and if the ecosystem could secure the right in legal settings, the
environment could be protected.
So Manus leaves the ambition to instill an environmental ight as an unfulfilled
vision. Beyond bits "bootstrapped from property or tort law", little exists and
even CERCLA-type provisions for natural resource damages still sputter for
implementation.
Professionalism, a relatively new tool, needs to carry forward the societal
expectation into lawyers' conduct. Both standing for nature, and an
environmental right for nature where no compromised human interest is
involved, attempt to bring an ethical goal of society into law. As great as those
concepts are, they are of limited subject matter, and they carry the social
expectation only a certain distance. Even if they were fully adopted, which
appears temporally at least some distance off, they do not cover the spectrum of
concerns to which professionalism applies.
IX. CONCLUSION
Those who practice environmental citizen suits probably agree with the
remarks of then-Senator David Durenberger, speaking as to their importance in
the Clean Air Act: "Citizen resources are an important adjunct to governmental
action to assure that these laws are adequately enforced. In a time of limited
Government resources, enforcement through court action prompted by citizen
suits is a valuable dimension of environmental law.."... The rise of deliberative
158. Manus, supra note 64, at 667 n.531.
159. Id. at 573, 667.
160. Id. at 587.
161. Remarks of U.S. Senator David Durenberger, concerning provisions of the Clean Air Act
for citizen suits, 136 CONG. REC. S3162-04 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990). The Act provided the initial
impetus for environmental citizen suits now present in most federal environmental laws. See
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democracy as a political and social process favors citizen suits' role in
implementation of environmental aspirations. This role needs to be fostered by
legal professionalism.
No version of professionalism will make environmental lawyers uniform in
their view of the subject. Citizen suit practitioners should benefit, however, from
having the various components of the agenda of green legal professionalism
collected into a professionalism theme.
The approach helps address the democracy-crushing weight of SLAPP suits.
It helps environmental law fend off the impossible contradictions placed upon
the mission of environmental law by radical expropriation compensation
proposals in international trade agreements. Professionalism should assist the
effort for objective, reviewable decision-making as we implement goals like
sustainability. It helps the expertise of government to become more available for
citizen litigation, especially in state law cases. It fosters better attorneys fees
provisions for prevailing citizens in state law cases who take on the complex
challenges of enforcement litigation.
In short, environmental lawyers can justify less and less a detachment from
ensuring the process of law implements the ethical goals of society. Omission
to bring citizen suits because the process is too daunting will mean we fail to
bring about the directives of society. A reconstructed professionalism can assist
the deliberative processes necessary for enforcement of environmental law.
TRANSAMTION REMEDIES: CERCLA AND RCRA CITIZEN SUIT CLAIMS (2001).
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